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For the evaluation of macroeconomic policies Colombian authorities rely heavily, if not 
exclusively, on the operational framework known as the Financial Programming Model 
developed by the IMF in the 1950s. Based on this static framework, the formulation of 
fiscal policy in the country, just as in various Latin American countries, focuses primarily 
on fiscal deficit and gross debt targets. However, the type of fiscal policy advice derived 
from it is not useful for understanding the asset-creating nature and the intertemporal 
trade-offs involved in public investment decisions. This paper develops a perfect 
foresight, dynamic small open economy model to provide an alternative framework for 
fiscal analysis and policy purposes. It is shown that the two competing frameworks 
deliver differing paths for the expected behavior of the Colombian economy. The 
proposed framework is then used to study the likely consequences of using public capital 
spending to achieve deficit targets since, in addition to an already high public debt, in the 
years ahead unfunded pension obligations will put enormous pressure on the Colombian 
government’s solvency. The results indicate that public capital compression is costly in 
terms of foregone growth and very ineffective in achieving fiscal consolidation. The 
adoption of fiscal rules such as the golden rule or the permanent balance rule to shield 
public investment from undue budgetary pressures makes little sense in the presence of 
sustainability concerns. The paper shows that a transitory capital spending increase is not 
self-amortizing in the long run; hence an extra peso of public capital spending 
deteriorates the intertemporal fiscal position. A permanent increase largely pays for itself 
in terms of additional tax revenue but this effect is offset by a deterioration of 
infrastructure user charges, as long as public prices are determined competitively. 
 
 
JEL: E62, H54, H55, H62   1
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For the evaluation of macroeconomic policies Colombian authorities rely heavily, if not 
exclusively, on the operational framework known as the Financial Programming Model 
originally developed by Polack (1957) in the 1950s and further refined by the IMF (1987) 
and Mussa and Savastano (1999). Based on this analytical framework, and on a 
constitutional mandate that requires policy coordination, the Central Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance periodically agree on a Macroeconomic Program containing the 
policies needed to regulate aggregate demand and to ensure a sustainable growth path for 
the economy and the public accounts. National authorities summarize this policy design 
process as follows: “(…) As has been the case for many years, the program takes as given 
the inflation target, forecasts of monetary aggregates, the government’s economic growth 
projection and the parameters of foreign exchange and fiscal policies. (…) Regarding 
fiscal policy, [the program] analyses revenue and expenditure goals and concludes with 
the analysis of the consistency of the public sector balance with the rest of economic 
variables” (Banco de la República, 1999). The IMF has a similar description: “In 
implementing the approach, the overall fiscal balance and public debt targets are set at 
levels which - in combination with other macroeconomic and structural polices - support 
specific output, inflation and balance of payments objectives, and ensure a sustainable 
(i.e., constant or declining) debt path” (IMF, 2004a). 
 
There are fundamental weaknesses in this analytical approach. The analytical framework 
is essentially static, important variables such as the growth rate are determined 
exogenously and thus independently of the policies being assessed and the type of 
economic policies evaluated do not correspond to what modern macroeconomic theory 
understands for economic policy. The timing of policies is irrelevant, expectations play 
no role whatsoever and forward-looking behavior as well as the fact that agents make 
purposeful decisions is plainly ignored.
1 Furthermore, the implicitly assumed connection 
between program designed policies and intertemporal fiscal solvency is unwarranted. 
 
An issue for which the existing policy evaluation process is particularly ill equipped is 
the question of fiscal space for investment in infrastructure since decision-makers cannot 
evaluate the intertemporal trade-offs they face and thus cannot assess how current actions 
affect future behavior and performance or how future actions restrict the set of current 
feasible actions available.
2 In the Financial Programming approach, policies are judged 
on the basis of their effect on conventional fiscal balance and gross public debt targets 
where the distinction between current and capital expenditures becomes blurred, 
intertemporal effects are overlooked and a bias against public investment may arise at 
times of fiscal retrenchment when it is clearer that investment is “the least rigid 
component of expenditure” (De Haan et al., 1996). In support of this last assertion, 
Echeverry et al. (2004) report recent data from the Colombian ministry of finance 
estimating in 97% the proportion of the central government budget that is “inflexible”, 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed critique of the Financial Programming Model see Edwards (1989). 
2 Other tools used by the IMF as analytical basis for policy advice and program design in middle income 
countries are the Balance Sheet Approach and the Debt Sustainability Analysis. These tools are not useful 
either to address the question at issue.   2
meaning that the authorities cannot exercise discretion over most budgetary items in the 
short run. According to this account, the only flexible component is public investment. 
 
The focus on fiscal deficit and debt targets may also bias public policies against capital 
spending by introducing arbitrary shortsighted debt limits which probably say nothing 
about the intertemporal solvency of the fiscal accounts. Debt limitations are explicitly 
introduced, for example, in the Colombian authorities’ program with the IMF where an 
adjustor is included for September and December 2004 to allow for additional public 
investment provided the government receives higher-than-expected privatization 
proceeds (IMF, 2004b). But why should investment projects be funded from current 
revenues or today’s taxpayers pay for the bill in its entirety if future generations of 
taxpayers will also benefit from the created infrastructure capital? In general, large 
investment projects will not be undertaken because their cost cannot be spread across 
generations by issuing debt.
3 
 
This criticism is not a minor theoretical point. Public investment compression may have 
sizeable adverse effects on growth and inequality. Calderón, Easterly and Servén (2003) 
argue that infrastructure investment cuts accounted for half or more of the reduction in 
Latin America’s primary deficit over the last two decades with an estimated growth 
sacrifice of 1 percent per annum in the long-run growth rate of various economies. 
Calderón and Servén (2003) estimate that during this period Latin America’s 
infrastructure gap relative to the seven successful economies of East Asia grew 40% to 
50% for road length, 50% to 60% for telecommunications (main telephone lines) and by 
90%-100% for power generation capacity. According to their estimates about one third of 
the increase in the average output gap between these two groups of countries is explained 
by the widening infrastructure gap. New empirical evidence has also shown that 
infrastructure development is an effective means of combating poverty through its direct 
positive effect on growth (Calderón and Servén, 2003; Loayza et al., 2003; and López, 
2003) and through its effect on the income and welfare of the poor, on top of its impact 
on average income (Calderón and Servén, 2004; López, 2003). 
 
This paper develops an alternative framework for policy analysis. The purpose of this 
paper is to construct a perfect-foresight dynamic general equilibrium model of 
endogenous growth of a small open economy to evaluate the effects of alternative fiscal 
policies. A calibrated version of the model is used to illustrate the effect of fiscal 
consolidation efforts in Colombia. Though the model in this paper is well suited for that 
particular endeavor, this paper is not about the design of a fiscal program. The focus of 
this paper is however circumscribed to assess the future space for public investment in 
infrastructure and the likely macroeconomic consequences of widening the existing 
public infrastructure gap. In addition to an already high public debt, in the years ahead 
future unfunded pension obligations will put enormous pressure on the Colombian 
government’s solvency. There is then the risk that the authorities will try to (partly) 
correct the budgetary position by adjusting the flexible component of the budget: 
spending on public capital formation. Is this policy - good for meeting conventional IMF-
                                                 
3 See Balassone and Franco (2000) for an interesting presentation in the context of the Stability and Growth 
Pact.   3
type targets - good for society too? What are the long-run growth consequences of such a 
policy? Does fiscal tightening (fully or partly) based on public investment compression 
really improve the fiscal position? Do the benefits of fiscal consolidation outweigh the 
costs of lower public capital investment? The study of the effects of this type of 
adjustment strategy has been mostly ignored by the macroeconomic literature despite the 
substantiated evidence available of the central role played by public investment cuts in 
episodes of fiscal consolidation in industrial and developing countries.
4 
 
This paper also addresses the feasibility and implications of implementing some of the 
proposals that have been put forth in the current EU debate on how to relax the fiscal 
constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Maastricht Treaty. In particular, the 
paper discusses the adoption of the so-called Golden Rule, the Permanent Balance Rule 
(Buiter and Grafe, 2004) and the quantitative implications of excluding commercially-run 
nonfinancial public enterprises or particular public investment projects from standard 
fiscal stance indicators. The paper examines the long-run returns of permanent and 
transitory changes in public investment to assess whether capital spending is self-
amortizing. 
 
Two features distinguish this model from standard small open economy models. First, in 
contrast to standard models (Mendoza, 1991; Correia et al., 1995; Senhadji, 1998; Kose, 
2002; etc.) an economy is presented where decision-making is decentralized into the 
hands of households and firms. This modeling choice makes it possible to study the effect 
on enterprise and household behavior of distortionary corporate and personal income 
taxation. Second, the basic framework is extended to include infrastructure capital as an 
input in the production function for final output. Infrastructure capital is a composite of 
public and private infrastructure capital stocks where public and private contents are not 
perfect substitutes. This setting generalizes existing infrastructure models (see for 
instance Ambler and Cardia, 1997; Collard, 1997; Dolmas and Huffman, 1997; Glomm 
and Ravikumar, 1997; Ferreira, 1998; Devarajan, et al., 1998) where the provider of 
infrastructure is either the government or the private sector - in a model of privatization - 
but not both. Also in contrast with existing literature, public capital is not modeled as a 
production externality but as a paid input earning a competitive rate of return. Publicly 
provided infrastructure is modeled as an exogenous forcing process while privately 
provided infrastructure investment is determined endogenously in the rational 
expectations equilibrium. 
 
Following recent empirical work on the determinants of sovereign yield spreads
5, the 
country is assumed to face an upward-sloping supply function of loans. Existing evidence 
seems to point that financial markets reward fiscal adjustment. Fiscal consolidation will 
decrease the stock of public debt and reduce the likelihood of a default on government 
bonds. Financial markets will react asking for a lower risk premium and interest rates 
decline. As a result, fiscal contraction will have an expansionary effect on the economy, 
further improving public accounts. However, if the fiscal contraction is implemented by 
                                                 
4 See for instance, Roubini and Sachs (1989), De Haan et al. (1996), Jonakin and Stephens (1999), 
Calderón et al. (2003) and IMF (2003). 
5 See for example, Cantor and Packer (1996), Min (1998) and Eichengreen and Mody (2000).   4
cutting capital spending and the private sector does not take over the government’s role, 
the effect on economic activity and government revenue may be reversed. Ultimately, the 
net effect of fiscal consolidation efforts based on public investment compression will 
depend on the interaction of the interest rate response to government debt, the response of 
output to public infrastructure capital and the response of the private provision of 
infrastructure to fiscal policy. Taking into account these distinct forces, this paper 
attempts to provide numerical answers to the posed questions. 
 
A cautionary note delimiting the scope of the paper is in order. The objective of the paper 
is to compute and analyze the perfect-foresight transitional dynamics of the model 
economy from 2004 onwards under alternative fiscal policies. Two driving forces induce 
the dynamics. The first is fiscal policy. The path of fiscal parameters from 2004 onwards 
is given exogenously, including inter alia public investment in infrastructure. Agents in 
the model economy are assumed to have perfect foresight over the path of future fiscal 
policy and respond purposefully to policy incentives. There is no optimal choice of 
government debt holdings and the government is a debtor that can borrow any amount of 
resources facing an upward-sloping supply schedule of loans, so that a higher borrowing 
premium is charged as the government debt-GDP ratio increases. The second force for 
off-steady state dynamics is explained by the fact that policy experiments based on public 
investment compression will not ensure the intertemporal sustainability of the fiscal 
accounts given the current policy stance in Colombia (as of year-end 2003) and the fact 
that the government has to pay for future unfunded state pension obligations. In absence 
of some sort of intertemporal balance rule, default is inexorable. To refrain from 
defaulting, the government is assumed to follow an active policy whereby tax rates are an 
increasing function of the government debt to GDP ratio. Bohn (1998, 2004) shows that a 
feedback rule whereby the primary surplus to GDP ratio is an increasing function of the 
initial debt to GDP ratio is a sufficient condition for sustainability. No effort is devoted to 
model the effect on the transition path of other alternative forcing processes (for instance 
nominal shocks or terms of trade, world interest rate or world business cycle 
developments). 
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic structure of the model 
economy. Section 3 discusses various issues regarding the calibration of deep parameters 
and the solution method. Section 4 describes the main features of the benchmark policy 
stance and conducts policy experiments. Section 5 assesses alternative formulas to open 
space for public infrastructure investment. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of identical infinitely lived 
households, a continuum of identical firms and a government sector composed of the 
central government and the decentralized public sector. The central government finances 
sequences of current and capital spending by taxing consumption expenditures and labor 
and capital income and by issuing domestic debt. The rest of the public sector owns and 
operates the stock of public infrastructure and sells infrastructure services to finance   5
current and capital expenditures and to produce an operating surplus target to improve or 
alleviate combined public sector finances. The representative firm hires business capital 
and labor services from households and rents infrastructure capital services from the rest 
of the government and the private sector to produce the home good. There are two goods 
in the economy: the home good and the foreign one. The domestic good has final uses in 
consumption (private and public), investment (private and public) and export. The foreign 
good, which plays the role of numéraire, can be used for final consumption (private) and 
investment (private). The relative price of the home good in terms of the foreign one, t p 
or the real exchange rate loosely speaking, is determined endogenously. The economy 
faces an imperfect capital market as reflected by an upward-sloping supply curve of debt. 
The private sector, in attempting to smooth consumption, may borrow abroad on behalf 
of the public sector. Hence the assumption of government bonds issued exclusively to the 
domestic market is inconsequential. 
 
The following model economy is expressed in per capita terms and no population growth 
is allowed. Following convention economy wide, per capita, aggregates are represented 
by capital letters while variables under the household’s control are denoted by lower case 
letters (except prices). In equilibrium individual choices and the corresponding aggregate 
magnitudes should be identical. 
 
2.1 The Production Sector 
 
There are three reproducible factors of production: infrastructure capital  t S , business 
capital t K  and human capital t H . The stock of infrastructure capital is a composite good 
obtained from aggregating infrastructure stocks that are publicly (
g
t S ) and privately (
p
t S)  
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where 
s λ  is a scale parameter, 
s ζ  is a share parameter bound between zero and one and 
s ν , -1 ν
s > ,  is a parameter governing the limited substitutability between public and 
private contents and the corresponding elasticity of substitution is given by  ) ν (1 1
s + . 
The privately and publicly provided stocks of infrastructure capital obey the following 
laws of motion: 
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where 
s δ  is the constant rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital, 
hs
t I  is private 




t  represents 
central (decentralized) government investment of the same type of good in infrastructure.   6





s  is an 
adjustment cost function in gross investment parameterized as a quadratic function and 
characterized by a single multiplicative parameter 
s ψ . 
 
Infrastructure services are modeled as private goods, characterized as being rival and 
excludable, in order to have a private sector willing to provide them. Since scarce 
resources are used to produce infrastructure services, it is rival - by definition. Since 
infrastructure is excludable, it is practical to exclude some users and to charge them. 
Other additional conditions giving rise to infrastructure market failures are also assumed 
absent (significant externalities, natural monopoly, etc.). 
 
Business capital is owned by households and accumulated according to 
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k δ  is the depreciation rate,  ) ( Ψ
k •  represents an internal adjustment cost function in gross 
investment described by a single parameter 
k ψ . Gross investment in the business sector 
is a composite of home and foreign goods which are considered imperfect substitutes 
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where 
i λ  is a scaling factor, 
i ζ  is a weight specifying the relative domestic content of 
business investment and 
i ν ,  -1 ν
i > , governs the elasticity of substitution given by 
) ν (1 1
i + . 
 
The remaining factor of production, human capital, can be accumulated in the production 
process via a learning-by-doing mechanism. As in Arrow (1962) the process of human 
capital accumulation is a by-product of the production experience. Because the 
production process causes learning-by-doing, human capital accumulation is the result of 
a non-deliberate action. Learning-by-doing in period t  is assumed to depend on current 
productive activity, 
 
t 1 - t
h
t Y χ )H δ - (1 H + =  
 
Learning-by-doing depends on aggregate production ( t Y , please excuse the abuse of 
notation), implying that households and firms do not internalize the effect of production 
decisions on human capital accumulation. The effect is a positive externality. Similar 
ideas are used in Romer (1986) and Collard (1997) for instance. 
h δ  is the rate of 
depreciation of human capital and χ ,  0 χ > , is the knowledge acquisition rate, the rate at 
which current productive activity is translated into knowledge. The growth rate of output   7
will be higher when resources are allocated by a benevolent social planner who can 
endogenize the externality. 
 
A homogeneous final home good t Y  is produced using business capital, infrastructure 
capital and labor input. The technology of the firm is Cobb-Douglas: 
 
φ - ω - 1
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The time endowment of the representative household is normalized to unity per period 
and  t N  stands for the fraction of the time endowment devoted to work. 
y λ  is a scale 
parameter, ω represents the capital share parameter in final output and φ is an analogous 
parameter for infrastructure capital. Since all production factors are reproducible and the 
technology exhibits constant returns to scale in the reproducible factors, the model 
economy generates endogenous growth. Growth will not come to a halt even if each 
individual factor, as assumed here, is subject to diminishing returns. 
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where  t Π  is per capita profits,  t w  is the real wage rate,  t r  is the rate of return on 
business capital, 
p
t ρ  is the rental rate of private infrastructure capital and 
g
t ρ  is the rental 
price of publicly provided infrastructure capital services. The optimality conditions 
deliver the standard condition that the marginal productivity must be equal to the rental 
price for each factor input: 
 
φ - ω -












φ - ω - 1





















s ν - p
1 - t
s
1 - ν - p
1 - t
s
φ - ω - 1







) )(S ζ - (1 ) (S ζ
) (S ζ















s ν - p
1 - t
s
1 - ν - g
1 - t
s
φ - ω - 1







) )(S ζ - (1 ) (S ζ
) )(S ζ - (1
) H (N ) (S ) (K φλ ρ  
 
The competitive firm operating a constant-returns technology earns zero profits in 
equilibrium.   8
2.2 The Representative Household’s Problem 
 
The representative household has preferences over sequences of consumption and leisure 
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Households draw utility from a composite consumption good  t c  and from leisure time  t l.  
The composite consumption good is itself a combination of two goods treated as 
imperfect substitutes by a CES Armington aggregator: consumption of home goods 
h
t c 
and consumption of imported goods 
m
t c . The parameter α is a preference relative weight 
on home goods and υ,  -1 υ > , determines the elasticity of substitution between home and 
imported consumption goods. β  is a subjective discount factor and ξ governs the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply. 
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t i ) represents investment of the home good in the business (infrastructure) 
sector and 
m
t i  investment of the imported good in the business sector.  t t  and  t O  stand for 
tax and nontax payments to the government. 
m
t M  represents intermediate goods imports. 
These are included here given their quantitative importance but they are not determined 
endogenously.  t t t )X p - (p
•  represents profits arising from export broking activities. The 
representative household buys an exogenously given amount of goods,  t X,  f r o m  t h e  
representative firm at the domestic price  t p  and sells it abroad at the exogenous world 
price 
•
t p  per unit of export good, where 
•
t p  is the relative price of the export good in 
terms of the import good, or the terms of trade. To simplify the model economy, both 
exports and intermediate imports are assumed to remain constant as a share of GDP.  t d i s  
foreign debt at the beginning of period t  and 
•
t r  is the interest rate, in terms of imports, 
charged on foreign debt.  t TR  represents other time t  lump-sum transfers.  t B  represents 
holdings of government debt securities issued by either the central government or the rest 
of the public sector. 
   9
It is well known that the equilibrium dynamics of a small open economy, with asset 
trading restricted to a noncontingent bond, features a random walk property that prevents 
the use of local approximation techniques to study the business cycle behavior of the 
economy around a stationary growth path. To induce stationarity in the equilibrium 
dynamics this paper introduces convex portfolio adjustment costs which help to pin down 
the steady state level of foreign debt.  ] [d Ψ 1 - t
d  represents a quadratic adjustment costs 
function in the deviation of debt from its steady state level.
6 
 
Taxes paid by the representative households amounts to: 
 


















t τ  is the consumption tax rate, 
k
t τ  is the capital income tax rate and 
w
t τ  is the labor 
income tax rate. The household’s total time endowment is normalized to unity per period 
and time spent in employment is subject to 
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The accumulation processes of business capital and private infrastructure capital are 
given by 
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where  t T  is the aggregate version of  t t . The central government buys home goods and 
collects revenue from distortionary and lump-sum taxes. Given the initial stock of debt 
                                                 
6 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) prove that alternative stationarity-inducing approaches (an endogenous 
discount factor or a debt-elastic interest-rate premium) yield exactly the same dynamics at business cycle 
frequencies, at least for the canonical small open economy model.   10
and the interest rate, the time path of central government debt is implicitly reconstructed 
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t O  i s  a n  a d j u s t m e n t  f a c t o r  u s e d  t o  t a r g et or to replicate the overall surplus 




tS ρ  represents public infrastructure gross user 
charges. Combined public sector accounts are obtained by consolidating both government 






















t t B B B + = . Because the initial 
rg
t B  is closed to zero 
(observed holdings of central government bonds in hands of the decentralized sector   
roughly match the rest-of-government gross debt) and the rest of government is assumed 
to generate a given surplus - holding everything else constant - the public sector’s 
consolidated stock of (net) debt may be lower than the central government’s (gross) stock 
of debt. 
 
2.4 Resource Constraints and the Stationarized Economy 
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The evolution of the level of net foreign debt, or the current account equation, is 
determined by: 
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The model economy is non-stationary because there is endogenous growth, as human 
capital can be accumulated without bound. It can be shown that the economy’s rate of 
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where  t η  is the gross rate of growth. To induce stationarity the common trend is removed 
by dividing all growing variables in the model by  t H . The symbol ^ represents 
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The transformed economy
7 possesses a well-defined steady state as long as non-
converging paths for the public finances are ruled out. To guarantee debt sustainability, 
the following reaction function of the fiscal authority describing the behavior of taxes is a 

























































where  Y ˆ B ˆ cg  is the steady state central government debt to GDP ratio. 
 
Finally, the economy faces an upward-sloping supply schedule for debt expressed as a 
two-component aggregate borrowing rate composed of a constant world interest rate  ) (r
• •  
and a variable premium  ) (zt . The borrowing premium depends on the central 
government debt to GDP ratio and is assumed to reflect the capital markets’ assessment 
of the economy’s ability to service its debt. This is why the same rate is charged to both 
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where ε is the debt/GDP semi-elasticity of the borrowing premium. 
 
 
3. CALIBRATION AND SOLUTION METHOD 
 
3.1 Parameter Values and the Structure of the Economy 
 
The model economy is parameterized in such a way that its long-run features mimic the 
observed structure of the Colombian economy in 2003. In other words, if the 2003 fiscal 
policy stance is assumed to remain unchanged, the long-run structure and growth 
performance of the model economy will be like that observed in 2003.
8 In particular, in 
the steady state of the model economy the expenditure side of the national income 
accounts coincides with the 2003 observed structure: household consumption represents 
62% of GDP and total private investment 11.5% of GDP, of which 2.74% of GDP is 
investment in infrastructure, according to Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) 
data. The public sector represents 26.8% of GDP, made up of central government 
purchases (16% of GDP), the rest of the public sector’s expenditures (8% of GDP) and 
                                                 
7 With logarithmic preferences there is no need to transform the subjective discount factor. 
8 The correction of existing macroeconomic imbalances requires the use of lump-sum adjustments. 
Specifically, the 2003 fiscal policy stance is made sustainable through lump-sum taxation.   12
public infrastructure investment. Public investment in infrastructure
9 amounts to 2.8% of 
GDP made up of central government investment (0.6% of GDP) and decentralized 
government infrastructure outlays (2.2% of GDP). The model economy also matches the 
average level and composition of imports. Total imports amount to 18.5% of GDP. This 
is composed of import of consumption goods (3.7% of GDP), capital goods (6.1% of 
GDP) and intermediate goods (8.7% of GDP). 
 
The structure of central government tax revenue is similar to the one observed in 
Colombia. Total tax revenue in the model amounts to 14.1% of GDP, which is very close 
to what is observed in the data. This percentage includes consumption taxes (7.4% of 
GDP), labor income taxes (0.6% of GDP) and capital income taxes (6.1% of GDP). The 
split in the income taxes between labor and capital income taxes is based on information 
from DIAN on tax withholding figures organized by type of taxpayer. The model’s gross 
debt-GDP ratio of the central government is set at 54%, which corresponds to the 
observed ratio by year-end 2003 (source: CONFIS). The net debt-GDP ratio of the rest of 
the public sector is set at 0% of GDP. This is roughly consistent with CONFIS data 
estimating the level of the combined public sector (‘non-financial public sector’) gross 
debt to be 68% of GDP and a combined net debt (excluding holdings of central 
government bonds in the portfolio of the rest of the public sector) to be close to 54% of 
GDP. The model’s external debt-GDP ratio is set at 50% of GDP (source: Banco de la 
República). 
 
The interest rate charged to private and public borrowers is the sum of two components: 
an exogenously given world interest rate proxied by the U.S. interest rate ( 4%, r =
• •  see 
Prescott, 1986; Backus et al., 1994) and a borrowing premium measured by the JP 
Morgan’s Latin America Eurobond Index spread. The average spread for Colombia was 
420 basis points over the last quarter of 2003  0.042) (z = . The semi-elasticity of the 




An expression for β can be obtained from the first order conditions, evaluated at the 
steady state, relating interest and subjective discount rates: 
 
                                                 
9 The public sector invests in physical infrastructure 2.8% of GDP, which corresponds to the average level 
during the 1994-2002 period (includes investments in transport, energy, telecom and oil sectors). Because 
there is no data available to disentangle the contributions of the central government and the rest of the 
public sector to this number, public investment in infrastructure is split using NIPA’s contributions to gross 
public capital formation. The average contribution of the central government is 23% during the period 
1994-2001. In consequence, under the benchmark policy stance the central government is estimated to 
invest 0.6% of GDP in infrastructure and the rest of the public sector invests the remaining 2.2% of GDP. 
10 In empirical studies the debt variable is generally defined as total external debt and not as total public 
debt. Min (1998) estimates  1 ε =  and Cantor and Packer (1996) find no significant relation between the 
debt-GDP ratio and yield spreads. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) estimate  1.3 ε = . Hilscher and Nosbusch 
(2004) define debt as total government external debt and from their point estimate it is possible to calculate 
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where η, 1.017 η = , is the 2003 per-capita gross rate of growth, which is consistent with 
the observed rate of growth of GDP of 3.84% in 2003, using an annual growth rate of the 
population aged 15-64 of 2.1% (source: DANE). This implies  0.94 β = . Note that the 
model is calibrated so that the length of a model period is one year. 
 
Ostry and Reinhart (1992) estimate the elasticity of substitution between nontradables 
and importables in consumption to be 1.28 for a sample of developing countries. I take 
this value as a proxy for the elasticity of substitution between 
h
t C ˆ  and 
m
t C ˆ . This implies a 
value for υ equal to -0.22. From the equilibrium versions of the household’s first order 
conditions for 
h
t c ˆ  and 
m
t c ˆ , evaluated at the steady state, and setting relative prices equal 
























va C  and 
h
va C  are defined as the average shares of imported consumption goods 
and home consumption goods in total value added, respectively. Given the assumed 
structure of the economy, all the required information on the right-hand side is known. 
Then set  0.883 α = . Lacking specific evidence on the elasticity of substitution between 
home and imported goods in investment, I use the same estimate as for the consumption 
elasticity. This implies  0.22   - ν
i = . 
 
The first order conditions for 
hk
t i ˆ  and 
m
t i ˆ , evaluated at the steady state, yield an 
expression for 
























i = . Exploiting the specification of the Armington aggregator calibrate 
1.868 λ


















   14
In addition, using a rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital of 4% (Collard, 1997), 
i.e. 0.04 δ
s = , and the steady state version of the law of motion for the stock of 
infrastructure capital, it is possible to calculate the ratios of private  ) (S
p
va  and public 
) (S
g
































Knowing that in Colombia the stock of total physical capital to GDP ratio is 2.63 (Loayza 






va va S - 2.63 S - S - 2.63 K = =  
 
Now using the law of motion for the stock of business capital, its rate of depreciation can 







η η - 1 δ + =  
 
Thus, set  0.037 δ
k = . 
 
Tax rates, consistent with the assumed structure of tax collections and the model’s tax 
definitions, are set at: 
 
0.9% τ 26.4% τ 12% τ
w k c = = =  
 
Based on the properties of the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology, the 





ω =  
 
where  r is the gross rate of return to business capital calculated, in turn, from the 
optimality condition for  t k ˆ  of the household’s optimization problem. Set  0.24 ω = . By 
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where 
p ρ , the gross rate of return to private infrastructure capital, can be obtained from 
the steady state version of the optimality condition for 
p
t s ˆ . By assuming 
g p ρ ρ = , φ is set 
equal to 0.147. This figure is very close to the value of 0.138 for the infrastructure 
elasticity of GDP estimated by Calderón and Servén (2005) for a sample of developing 




The values of the parameters 
s ζ  and 
s λ  are obtained from the first order condition for 
p
1 t S ˆ
−  and the CES aggregator of infrastructure. In the absence of empirical evidence on the 
elasticity of substitution between private and public infrastructure stocks 
s ν  is set at 3.0, 
















































s ζ  equal to 0.48 and 
s λ  equal to 2.0. Parameter sensitivity analysis is applied to 
assess how the degree of substitutability in the provision of infrastructure services 
influences the behavior of the economy. 
 
Next, the preference parameter ξ governing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
labor supply is set equal to 1.6, a number consistent with an elasticity of 1.7 adopted by 
Greenwood et al. (1988) as a reasonable compromise. The steady state level of 
employment is set at  3 1 N = , which is a standard choice in the literature. The parameter 

























Finally,  χ  and the scale parameter 
y λ  were chosen so that the model’s steady state 
output is normalized to  100 Y ˆ Y ˆ = = . Set χ  equal to 0.0006, which satisfies the law of 
                                                 
11 The existing empirical work for Colombia has followed Aschauer (1989) who modeled the aggregate 
production function with public infrastructure capital as an input. Sánchez (1994) and Cárdenas et al. 
(1995) report point estimates ranging from 0.10 to 1.59. Though our parameter value is at the lower end of 
this broad range, these econometric results are not taken into consideration as they are subject to criticism 
in various ways (implausibly large marginal productivity of public capital, specification problems, 
simultaneity bias, theoretical underpinning, etc.).   16
motion for the stock of human capital, assuming a constant depreciation rate of 4%, i.e. 
0.04 δ










From the specification of the production technology the scaling parameter 
y λ  is set at 
30.15. Table 1 summarizes baseline parameter values used hereinafter. 
 
3.2 Solution Method 
 
There is no analytical solution to the described optimization problem. To obtain an 
approximate solution, the system of first order conditions is linearized around its 
deterministic steady state and the resulting multivariate linear rational expectations 
equation system is solved numerically with the Quadratic Determinantal Equation 
method developed by Binder and Pesaran (1995, 1997). Before linearizing the system of 
equations describing the equilibrium, I introduced a change of variables to express all 
macro aggregates (except output) as a fraction of GDP. As a consequence, the numerical 
method is adjusted to provide a solution in terms of the levels of the system’s redefined 
endogenous variables and not in terms of their deviations from steady state. 
 
Let  t X  be the vector of endogenous variables and  t ℘  the vector of policy and exogenous 
variables at time t defined as follows: 




































































































































































where the subscript “va” means that the corresponding variable has been expressed as a 
fraction or share of GDP (for instance,  t t t va, Y ˆ K ˆ K = ). The solution is a first order 
difference equation system of the form: 
 
t 1 t 1 t t F D X C constant X ℘ + ℘ + + = + −  
 
where the arrays: constant, C , D  and F are complicated functions of the model’s 




= ℘  and 
the starting point  ) (X2003 , it is possible to compute the equilibrium dynamics of the 
economy from 2004 onwards. 
 
 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
 
4.1 Baseline Policy Stance and Benchmark Economy 
 
Before conducting policy experiments, it is necessary to spell out the current fiscal policy 
stance and describe how it is modified under alternative experimental setups. Based on 
year 2003 data, the “inherited” policy stance is characterized by the following salient 
features (see Table 2 for completeness).   18
As in the data (CONFIS, 2004), central government revenues amount to 15.6% of GDP 
made up of non-tax revenues (1.5% of GDP) and tax revenues (14.1% of GDP). 
Consistent with the tax collection figure, with the observed revenue composition and with 
the model’s tax definitions, the baseline consumption tax rate is calibrated at 12%, the 
capital income tax rate at 26.4% and the labor income tax rate at 0.9%. On the other hand, 
central government primary expenditures represent 16.6% of GDP of which 
approximately 0.6% of GDP is classified as capital spending. As is apparent, the central 
government primary balance exhibits a deficit of 1% of GDP and a with-interest deficit of 
5.5% of GDP, revealing the burden of a debt of 54% of GDP. 
 
Decentralized government accounts are built on the basis of the model economy 
specification and data. The rest of the public sector invests 2.2% of GDP in infrastructure 
and exhibits an overall surplus of 2.4% of GDP. This brings the combined overall public 
sector balance to a deficit equivalent to 3.1 of GDP. Given interest rate and growth rate 
prospects, if the described fiscal policy parameters remain unchanged, the current stance 
is unsustainable. It is made sustainable by appropriate lump-sum transfers to the 
government. By construction, if this adjusted fiscal policy stance is assumed to remain 
forever, the economy will remain or converge to its steady-state equilibrium, as described 
in the preceding section.
12 Let us assume this is the case. 
 
The preceding portrait of the public finances does not offer a complete panorama, 
however. The current expenditures of the central government are assumed to remain 
constant in the future (at 16% of GDP) which is indeed a bad assumption. This 
assumption does not take into account the major source of concern with respect to the 
evolution of the public finances: future unfunded state pension liabilities. Figure 1 
displays the path of expected deficits of the state social security system (solid line) as 
calculated by the DNP. In 2004 the pension deficit is approximately 3.1% of GDP. From 
then on it will increase steadily up to a peak of 6.2% of GDP in 2014 and then decrease 
gradually. Nevertheless, deficits will remain over 3% of GDP up until year 2040. Even 
disregarding the “inherited” fiscal imbalance, it is clear that unfunded pension liabilities 
will represent a major source of fiscal stress and intertemporal solvency problems in the 
years ahead. 
 
The expected path of current expenditures of the central government is constructed by 
adding to the baseline expenditures path (i.e. 16% of GDP from 2003 onwards) the 
amount associated with the dotted line in Figure 1, which corresponds to the difference 
between the estimated future deficits of the state pension system and the amount of 
pension transfers already incorporated into the 2003 central government budget (approx. 
3% of GDP). 
 
Holding constant other fiscal policy parameters, the new path of expenditures will push 
the economy off its steady state balanced growth trajectory and lead to an explosive 
growth of the government debt, eventually violating the transversality condition (No-
Ponzi Game condition). The question is how to finance the future path of government 
                                                 
12 Keep in mind that the correction of this part of Colombia’s fiscal imbalance and well as its effect on 
economic behavior are not being addressed in the ensuing policy experiments.   19
expenditures, restoring fiscal solvency. This paper assesses two alternatives
13: 1) tax-
financed pension transfers, hereinafter referred to as the tax-financed scheme or scenario 
and 2) additional pension payments financed by public capital spending cutbacks. 
 
4.2 Experiment 1: Distortionary Tax Financing 
 
This section offers an exposition of the macroeconomic effects of using distortionary 
taxation to finance future pension outlays. In stricto sensu, the financing strategy uses a 
combination of debt and tax financing. The experiment is set up so that the economy 
initially issues new debt to pay for growing pension transfers and then adjusts tax rates in 
response to changes in the central government debt to GDP ratio to ensure the 
sustainability of the financing scheme. Obviously, the transition path of the economy will 
depend on the aggressiveness with which policymakers adjust taxes. The responsiveness 
of taxes to the debt-GDP ratio controls the pace at which debt accumulates along the 
transitional dynamics and is assumed equal across experiments.
14 
 
From the solution of the model - the recursive equilibrium law of motion - it is possible to 
compute from 2004 onwards the macroeconomic dynamics generated by the new path of 
the exogenous variables. The results of the numerical simulation for the first decade are 
reported in Figures 2A (macroeconomic aggregates), 2B (fiscal performance) and 2C 
(fiscal policy). All depicted variables, except rates and relative prices, are expressed as a 
share of GDP. 
 
The tax financing scheme has sizeable effects on relative prices and quantities. There will 
be a persistent trend toward real exchange rate appreciation and in the national income 
and product accounts higher public spending is partly accommodated at the expense of 
lower private consumption and total investment. Since public investment, as a share of 
GDP, is assumed to remain constant in this experiment, the fall in total investment, as a 
share of GDP, is mainly explained by a reduction of private investment in both the 
business sector and the infrastructure sector. The private sector will be crowded out by 
the expected pension outlays. 
 
Pension payments initially financed by issuing additional debt will tend to stimulate 
economic activity judging by the fact that the growth rate will increase somewhat relative 
to the outcome for year 2003 (3.84%). This expansionary outcome may persuade 
policymakers to delay adjustment as long as capital markets are willing to finance such 
deficits. But as soon as debt starts growing, interest rate and tax rate hikes will rapidly 
cool down the economy. Despite substantial tax rate and tax collection increases, central 
government debt will increase from 54 percent of GDP in 2003 to 75% of GDP over the 
next 10-year period. 
 
                                                 
13 Feasible alternatives are also the reduction of current expenditures and a pension reform reducing 
pension obligations. If taken into account, they only imply a new trajectory for the exogenous path of future 
expenditures.        
14 In all experiments the debt-GDP semi-elasticity of the different tax rates is unitary.    20
For the sake of comparison, Figures 3A and 3B depict “official” forecasts recently 
published by the Ministry of Finance (Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2004) 
and IMF (2004b), respectively. Though none of these pieces provide a clear description 
of the policies being implemented, they foresee a significant consolidation effort with no 
apparent growth sacrifice. This comparison provides an opportunity to assess whether the 
proposed approach to policy evaluation provides further insights into understanding the 
relation between policies and economic performance vis-à-vis the perspective provided 
by the Financial Programming approach. Interestingly, the two approaches provide 
fundamentally opposing views on the economy’s future growth path. 
 
The Ministry of Finance recently released its Medium-Term Economic Program. This 
report provides medium-term baseline projections (2004-2020) for the economy’s main 
macroeconomic aggregates, assuming the continuation of current policies (no new 
reforms are spelled out). The report assumes that from 2004 onwards the economy’s GDP 
will grow at a rate of 4% per annum retaking, for no apparent economic reason, its long-
run path of economic growth (see Figure 3A). On the expenditure side of the national 
income and product accounts, growth is fueled by private consumption and investment - 
in sharp contrast to predictions of the intertemporal model. The share of private 
consumption and investment in GDP will increase from 62% to 64% for the former and 
from 13.3% to 17.5% for the latter. The space gained by consumers and private investors 
in GDP is at the expense of the public sector whose share will shrink by 6% of GDP over 
the next 15 years with no noticeable growth impact. Hence public debt will fall from 54% 
of GDP in 2003 to 42% fifteen years later. In summary, in the authorities’ view, the fiscal 
position will improve “endogenously” thanks to a rapid resumption of private economic 
activities and historical growth trends, leaving little trace of what was once considered a 
sustainability concern. 
 
The IMF (2004b) also provides baseline projections and similar developments are 
forecast for the economy (see Figure 3B). Its projections assume that the authorities can 
sustain a combined public sector primary surplus of 2.7% of GDP per year starting in 
2005. This would require an adjustment of approximately 3.8% of GDP in the combined 
primary surplus over the 2003 stance (including new pension obligations, in average 
2.5% of GDP in the near future). If an adjustment of this magnitude is assumed, the 
Fund’s debt sustainability analysis “finds” (“assumes”) that, under all stress tests, the 
public accounts are sustainable. However, the report does not explain how to achieve 
such an adjustment in the very short run with no apparent growth effect (the economy’s 
growth rate is constant at 4% per year in the next six years). 
 
4.3 Experiment 2: Public Investment Cutbacks 
 
Both the government’s Economic Program and the Fund’s Third Review Report 
anticipate substantial fiscal consolidation efforts in the short run: the first requires a 
reduction of government spending of 6% of GDP and the second an improvement in the 
combined primary balance of 3.8% of GDP. In both, the distinction between capital and 
current expenditures is irrelevant because the economy is assumed to grow at its 
historically average rate, independently of how fiscal policy unfolds. This section uses   21
the intertemporal framework to assess the growth toll and other macroeconomic 
consequences of a fiscal adjustment (at most of 2.8% of GDP - because this is what the 
public sector spends on average in infrastructure) based on public investment 
compression. 
 
The first experiment conducted in this section assumes that central government capital 
spending is pared to nothing. The central government, in fact, invests very little in 
infrastructure (0.6% of GDP) so minimum effects on public finances should be expected. 
The baseline policy stance is modified to incorporate no central government investment 
spending (see Figure 4C). Under this financing scheme, authorities initially reduce capital 
spending to finance additional pension transfers, but given their relative magnitudes, soon 
have to resort to new debt placements and subsequent tax increases. The difference 
between the setup of this experiment and the one discussed in the preceding section is the 
permanent shut down of the central government investment activity to contribute to fiscal 
adjustment. 
 
The behavior of the economy is shown in Figures 4A (macroeconomic aggregates), 4B 
(fiscal performance) and 4C (fiscal policy). The behavior of the economy under the “tax-
financed” strategy, depicted by dashed lines, is included for comparison. The central 
government primary surplus effectively improves by approximately 0.6% of GDP in the 
very short run, giving the illusion that this type of adjustment works, but after seven years 
or so its time path is very similar to the one observed under the “tax-financed” scheme. 
This implies that public investment contraction is ineffective to improve the fiscal 
position in the medium term and to restore fiscal solvency in the long run. The reason is 
that investment compression hits harder economic growth than a “tax-financed” program, 
despite reigning lower interest and tax rates (in the medium term). 
 
There seems to be an improvement in the central government overall budget balance 
relative to the “tax-financed” scenario over the 10-year horizon illustrated in Figure 4B. 
Nonetheless, this effect will ultimately prove to be transient too. By year 2030 (not 
shown in the figure) the time path of the overall budget balance is indistinguishable from 
the one observed under the “tax-financed” alternative. It is worth mentioning that 
investment compression may cause a long lasting improvement in the decentralized 
government sector finances and therefore, in the combined accounts, thanks to a 
substantial increase in the overall cost of public infrastructure services, reflecting the 
shortage of infrastructure capital. The private sector does not fill the gap in the provision 
of infrastructure services left by the withdrawal of the central government and, on the 
contrary, finds it optimal to reduce slightly infrastructure spending. 
 
In the second experiment of this section the decentralized public sector contributes to the 
process of fiscal adjustment by reducing capital spending. In addition to a reduction in 
capital expenditures at the central government level equal to 0.6% of GDP, the rest-of-
government capital expenditures are gradually pared down from a level of 2.2% of GDP 
to nothing over the course of several years (see Figure 5C) at a pace dictated by expected 
pension payments. This adjustment is not big enough to meet all funding needs.   22
Additional financing requirements are satisfied through the issuance of debt and tax 
increases. 
 
The behavior of the model economy conditional on the described policy is depicted in 
Figures 5A (macroeconomic aggregates), 5B (fiscal performance) and 5C (fiscal policy). 
Again, the behavior of the model economy under the tax financing scheme (dashed lines), 
is included for comparison. While public investment is falling in total by 2.8% of GDP, 
the time path of total investment exhibits a greater deterioration (4.8% of GDP after a 
decade and 5.2% after three decades, both measured relative to the “tax-financed” 
scenario) accounted for by lower private investment both in business capital and in 
infrastructure capital. It is interesting to confirm that the role of the government in 
providing infrastructure services is not taken over by the private sector. Private 
investment in infrastructure tends to decline in tandem with public investment. As a 
result, the economy’s average growth rate falls almost by 0.4% after a decade and by 1% 
in the long-run. The negative direct effect of public investment cuts on growth outweighs 
the expansionary effect that a fiscal adjustment plan (resorting to investment cuts) exerts 
though lower interest rates. 
 
In order to deliver a lower capital stock in the steady state and to accommodate lower 
investment activity on the expenditure side of the national product accounts, private 
consumption expenditures increase as a share of GDP. Tax collections benefit from the 
recomposition of GDP toward consumption but this effect is not strong enough to 
compensate for deteriorated growth prospects. Interestingly, the economy with no public 
capital investment ends up charging almost the same tax rates as in the “tax-financed” 
program, but revenue performance is far more dismal (see Figure 5C). Tax revenue drops 
by 1.4% of GDP approximately after a decade relative to the benchmark. 
 
This experiment reconfirms our previous findings: the improvements in the central 
government primary and overall balances are transitory and public investment 
compression is incapable of bringing public finances toward solvency. In contrast to our 
previous finding on the effect on decentralized government finances, this experiment 
finds that their improvement is ephemeral too. But, as in the previous experiment, the 
source of that improvement can be found in a substantial increase in the rental price of 
public infrastructure capital. According to Figure 5D the user cost of public infrastructure 
capital ) (ρ
g
t  will increase from 15.1% in 2003 to 29% two decades later and to 36% in 
the long-run. In contrast, under the “tax-financed” scheme, the long-run rental price of 
public infrastructure services will converge to 14%-15%. 
 
To summarize, an established empirical literature has found that governments in 
developing as well as in developed countries have attempted to sustain or regain sound 
budgetary positions by reducing public investment. The experiments conducted in this 
section show that this type of adjustment has a transient effect on medium-term fiscal 
deficits and a negligible impact on long-run solvency. However, its cost, in terms of 
foregone growth, could be substantial. 
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4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
To compensate for the lack of direct parameter estimates for Colombia, the calibration 
procedure has exploited additional sources of information as is the existing literature on 
developing countries. Even so, in a number of cases the calibration criterion is simply 
that model parameter choices be reasonable on the basis of other independent estimates. 
To assess the reliability of the parameterization strategy and robustness of the simulated 
results, these parameter values are perturbed to perform a sensitivity analysis. Since these 
parameters values are generally unknown, instead of evaluating the effect of small 
changes around baseline values, the sensitivity analysis is conducted for extreme 
parameter settings to determine the conditions under which conclusions may possibly 
vary. This section investigates the sensitivity of the results to five parameters for which 
there is little knowledge or reliable data. The parameters are: 1) the elasticity of 
substitution between public and private infrastructure, governed by 
s ν ; 2) the elasticity of 
substitution between home and imported investment goods, controlled by 
i ν ; 3) the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply, governed by ξ; 4) the rate of 
depreciation of the stock of infrastructure  ) (δ
s  and 5) the rate of depreciation of human 
capital ) (δ
h . Simulations are also conducted for alternative values of ε. 
 
The main results of the simulation experiments for sensitivity analysis are summarized in 
Table 3. The top panel shows the medium-term (year 2014) and long-term (year 2049) 
outcomes of the economy that resorts to public investment cuts to correct its fiscal 
position. The bottom panel shows the corresponding behavior for the economy under the 
“tax-financed” alternative. Relative to the tax financing scheme, public investment cuts 
are systematically associated with lower tax collections (as a share of GDP) in the 
medium term. Across all parameter settings, tax revenues fall between 0.8% and 2% of 
GDP in a decade. In the longer run, those economies will require higher tax collections as 
well as higher tax rates to guarantee sustainability. 
 
The conclusion that public investment compression reduces growth is robust under a 
wide range of parameter values, and despite the fact that fiscal consolidation is rewarded 
with lower interest rates. The policy lesson is that not all types of fiscal adjustment will 
allow for the economy to reap the benefits of fiscal consolidation. When fiscal 
consolidation is achieved through increasing revenues the growth toll is small (bottom 
panel in Table 3. Let’s remember that the baseline growth rate is 3.84%) both in the 
medium- and long-run. When fiscal consolidation is achieved through reducing capital 
spending (upper panel), the growth rate cost is positive and in some cases very sizable. 
The growth rate may fall by 0.2% to 0.9% in the medium run or by 0.2% to 1.8% in the 
long run if the reference level is the baseline rate, or may fall 0.1-0.8 percent in the 
medium run or 0.0%-1.6% in the long run if the reference point is the “tax-financed” 
scenario. In no scenario, capital spending cutbacks give rise to higher growth rates than 
under a “tax-financed” scheme. The lowest growth cost, relative to “tax-financed” 
scenarios, is observed when public and private infrastructure capital stocks are highly 
substitutable 0.75) (ν
s − =  for each other in production, in which case there is no growth 
sacrifice. If the private sector is able to fully fill the gap left by the withdrawal of   24
government - withdrawal from funding infrastructure investment - a fiscal consolidation 
effort through reducing capital spending is similar, in terms of its effect on growth, to a 
one based on increasing taxes. It is worth mentioning in passing that Calderón, Easterly 
and Servén (2003) estimate a strong positive statistical association between public and 
private infrastructure in Latin America, suggesting that the two are complements rather 
than highly substitutes. 
 
Finally, alternative values for the semi-elasticity of the credit spread induce a time-series 
behavior similar to that observed under the benchmark parameterization. 
 
 
5. EXPANDING SPACE FOR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 
 
Based on the current EU debate on fiscal rules, some alternatives have been proposed to 
ameliorate the growth consequences of fiscal austerity. In this subsection some of these 
alternatives are briefly reviewed from the perspective of economies with sustainability 
problems, an important consideration in planning to adopt this sort of fiscal rules. The 
adoption of such fiscal rules is impractical in countries like Colombia where in addition 
to concerns about the sustainability of the public finances, public investment spending 
does not “pay for itself”, a result that runs counter the conventional wisdom (see Perotti, 
2004). 
 
The Golden Rule. A proposal to increase budget flexibility is the adoption of the so-
called golden rule of public sector borrowing. The golden rule recognizes the different 
roles of current and capital spending and recommends a dual budget to separate the two 
types of operations. Over the business cycle current expenditures must be equal to tax 
receipts and borrowing should not exceed government investment. As a result, public 
investment expenditures may be excluded from the computation of standard deficit 
measures to avoid undue pressures. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) propose a variant of 
the UK rule in which borrowing is only allowed to fund net public investment (net of 
depreciation). 
 
Without entering into a discussion of issues of expenditure reclassification or of which 
parts of spending are classified as current and which count as investment, the main point 
to highlight here is that the objective of the adopted fiscal framework should not be the 
loosening of the fiscal policy stance. In the first place, the adopted fiscal framework must 
make sense in the long-run. In particular it should be consistent with government 
solvency. The adoption of a golden rule does not ensure the financial sustainability of the 
state. In the UK rule, for instance, the golden rule is accompanied by the sustainable-
investment rule: “public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP will be held over the 
business cycle at a stable and prudent level”. 
 
The current budgetary position of the country is not one that is appropriate for adopting a 
golden rule. The golden rule requires that current spending be balanced by equivalent 
taxation. This requirement, as seen by the forecast path of public debt, is not being 
satisfied.   25
However, as noted by Perotti (2004), the golden rule is based - explicitly or implicitly - 
on the notion that public investment “pays for itself” in the long run. If this were the case, 
investment spending does not deteriorate or even affect the long-run fiscal position and 
the dual budget approach is justified. Perotti (2004) tests this hypothesis within a VAR 
framework. A dynamic general equilibrium model, like the one developed in the 
preceding sections, is best suited to tackling this undertaking. 
 
Using the steady state version of the system of equations describing the economy’s 
equilibrium, it is possible to assess the long-run effect on macroeconomic outcomes of a 
permanent increase of 1% of GDP of public investment in infrastructure. Let superscript 
∗ denote steady state allocations under the increased investment regime and 
o  denote 
allocations under the baseline policy stance - already computed in preceding sections 
(referred to as initial steady state). Public investment pays for itself if the present value of 
additional tax revenues plus the present value of additional public utility charges, both as 
a proportion of the present value of GDP under the baseline policy stance  )) Y ( PV (
o , is 
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where TR  stands for tax revenue and PV stands for present value. 
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o τ  corresponds 
to the steady state tax collection to GDP ratio under the alternative (baseline) policy 
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where UC  represents user charges received from the sale of public infrastructure services 
and 
g
va S  is the steady state public infrastructure stock to GDP ratio. 
 
Table 4 displays the additional tax revenues and user fees generated by a permanent 
increase of 1% of GDP in public investment at the central government level. The table 
also displays the additional revenues and user charges generated by a similar increase in 
current expenditures. From the point of view of tax collection, capital spending is self- 
financing since the present value of tax revenues increases by more than 1% of GDP. In 
fact, it generates additional tax revenues for 1.44% of GDP under the baseline 
parameterization. However, this effect is fully offset by the fall in user charges. In the 
model economy, user fees correspond to the marginal cost of providing public 
infrastructure services and they strongly decline as the public capital stock increases   26
about 15% of GDP in response to a permanent 1% of GDP increase in public investment. 
In building up the stock of public capital, public debt increases somewhat, pushing a 
subsequent increase in tax rates to ensure the sustainability of the experiment. If the 
automatic tax response is shut down, tax revenue increases remain high at 0.86% of GDP 
while the fall in user charges remains relatively unchanged. 
 
On the other hand, an increase in current expenditures has an almost negligible effect on 
user charges while it raises tax revenue by 0.69% of GDP if tax rates are allowed to vary. 
But at unchanged tax rates no additional tax revenue is generated. The results are robust 
to a series of parameter sensitivity tests except when public and private capital stocks are 
highly substitutable  0.75) (ν
s − = . In this case the accumulation of public capital raises both 
tax revenue and user charges, thus rendering capital spending self-amortizing. 
 
The Permanent Balance Rule. The permanent balance rule (Buiter and Grafe, 2004) is 
based on a strong form of tax smoothing. It says that once an economy reaches its 
‘permanent tax rate’ (the constant GDP share of taxes that ensures government solvency), 
that is, once government solvency is guaranteed, temporary spending increases (not only 
including temporary increases in capital spending) should be financed by issuing debt. 
 
The rule increases budget flexibility by allowing for borrowing to fund temporary 
increases in expenditures with the proviso that default is ruled out. Otherwise, the rule 
does not make sense in the long run. Again, the adoption of a permanent balance rule is 
not relevant at this juncture. The tax rate in the Colombian economy is not ensuring 
public sector solvency either now or in the future. As shown by the simulation results, 
substantial tax increases are required in the future to ensure sustainability. 
 
However, aside from the countercyclical management of public spending where no 
deterioration of the government’s finances is expected if spending is allowed to increase 
in contractionary phases of the business cycle and then reduced sufficiently during the 
next upswing, there is still an open question: the long-run budgetary consequences of a 
temporary increase in capital expenditures to assess whether a temporary increase pays 
for itself in the long run or if it ends up deteriorating the fiscal position and eventually 
violating the government’s transversality condition. 
 
The dynamic behavior of the economy is studied using impulse response analysis. 
Impulse response functions generated by the model trace the response of the economy 
over time to a 1% of GDP innovation in capital spending carried out by the central 
government. The experiment assumes that the economy starts from the initial steady 
state
15. Once the economy’s transition path has been computed it is possible to estimate 
additional user charges and tax collections. Their present value figures are computed over 
a truncated horizon of 1200 periods. Given the nature of the experiment - i.e., a 
temporary capital outlay leading to a temporary increase in the public capital stock -
additional depreciation charges may be used to pay for investment spending in absence of 
a maintenance obligation. 
                                                 
15 A description of the methodology can be found in King, Plosser and Rebelo (2002).   27
Table 5 displays the present value of the additional tax revenues, additional user charges 
and additional depreciation charges generated by transitory increases in capital and 
current expenditures. The results are robust. There is no evidence that government 
investment pays for itself. A 1% of GDP increase in capital outlays pays in the most 
favorable scenario (highly substitutable capital stocks) only a tenth of its cost in the long 
run. The long-run return of current expenditures is also very tiny. An extra peso of capital 
or current spending deteriorates the intertemporal fiscal position. 
 
Commercially-Run Public Enterprises. The exclusion of commercially-run public 
enterprises or specific investment projects from fiscal deficit and debt targets represents 
an alternative way to introduce budgetary flexibility by removing constraints on 
investment activities carried out by these enterprises. Since this represents a simple 
accounting procedure it is feasible in the sense that its adoption is not logically 
inconsistent with the overall budget situation. 
 
To avoid underestimating government liabilities (explicit or implicit) caused by deficient 
management of public enterprises where the government will have to ultimately foot the 
bill for any losses that these may incur, the IMF has proposed various stringent criteria 
for assessing whether public enterprises are commercially run
16: 1) managerial 
independence (pricing and employment policies); 2) relations with the government 
(subsidies and transfers, regulatory and tax regimes); 3) financial conditions 
(profitability, creditworthiness) and 4) governance structure (stock listing, outside audits 
and annual reports, shareholders’ rights). By applying these criteria to 14 large 
Colombian public enterprises, the IMF has found that only one (ISA, a transmission 
electricity enterprise) is commercially run. 
 
According to Fainboim and Rodríguez (2004), the bulk of public investment expenditures 
in Colombia (approximately 90%) are undertaken by 20 public enterprises. The REDI 
report (World Bank, 2004) claims that there are a number of public enterprises which are 
fairly close to meeting most of the IMF criteria. If all 20 of these enterprises are excluded 
from fiscal targets, and they normally invest around 2.2% of GDP
17, the expected 
behavior of the main macroeconomic aggregates will be as the one depicted in Figure 2A. 
The fiscal accounting (Figure 2C) changes somewhat depending on how public 
enterprise-government relations are regulated. Public enterprises with an important 
infrastructure investment activity generated an operational surplus in 2003 which was 
close to 1% of GDP (Table 6), where 60% of it is explained by ECOPETROL (oil 
enterprise). If it is assumed that surpluses are transferred to the central government, the 
primary balance will improve. But nothing fundamental is changing. A surplus that 
improves consolidated accounts will appear to improve central government accounts 
when public enterprises are excluded from the definition of the public sector. But the 
rationale for the exclusion of public enterprises is precisely the protection of their 
investment plans from budgetary pressures. The central government would be in a weak 
position to require the generation of savings and transfer of resources to finance its 
deficit. As a result, central government finances may deteriorate further with the 
                                                 
16 See IMF (2004a). 
17 This is the average level of decentralized public sector investment during the 1994-2002 period.   28
redefinition of the public sector. But if investment policies have been effectively 
constrained by budgetary policies, it is possible to have the beneficial effect of higher 
investment by excluded enterprises. The problem is that this approach may remove 
investment constraints on areas that are not the most desirable from a social point of view 
or where there are no infrastructure shortages. 
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The standard tool for formulation and evaluation of fiscal policies in Colombia, just as in 
various Latin American countries, focuses primarily on fiscal deficit and gross debt 
targets within a static framework. The type of fiscal policy advice derived from this 
framework could be useful in understanding the effects of current government spending 
decisions but not in understanding the asset-creating nature and the intertemporal trade-
offs involved in public investment decisions. As the evidence shows, many countries in 
the region reduced public investment expenditures in the 1980s and 1990s in an attempt 
to correct fiscal imbalances. Is this type of adjustment, which is valid from a deficit 
accounting perspective, worthwhile in an intertemporal setting? Are the gains in terms of 
deficit and debt indicators worth the costs in terms of foregone growth? These are 
important questions for policymakers but the existing framework at their disposal does 
not allow them to learn what fundament fiscal reforms will do to the economy. 
 
This paper tries to provide a better sense of those effects by developing an alternative 
framework for fiscal analysis and policy purposes. The case of Colombia is illustrative 
because the two approaches provide different perspectives on the likely transitional 
dynamics of the economy in the near future. The model predicts a huge solvency threat 
posed by the already high government debt and by expected deficits in the state pension 
system. 
 
The model is then used to answer a policy question. What happens if Colombian 
authorities try to alleviate the pressure of unfunded pension liabilities on solvency by 
reducing capital spending? If the public sector as a whole shuts down its investment 
activity (2.8% of GDP), a substantial fiscal consolidation effort but still far from the 
required adjustment to prevent government debt (relative to GDP) from growing, the 
model predicts a striking outcome: public finances and therefore fiscal solvency will not 
improve in the medium- and long-term and the long-run rate of growth will be slashed by 
1%. The public policy implication of this paper is obvious: the efficacy of public 
investment compression to solve budgetary problems is very limited while it is important 
to growth. The results suggest putting little credence in the idea that public investment 
cuts bring the fiscal position toward solvency. 
 
The adoption of fiscal rules such as the golden rule or the permanent balance rule to 
shield infrastructure investment from budgetary pressures makes little sense in the 
presence of sustainability concerns. To ensure sustainability these rules require a stable 
level of debt to GDP ratio (sustainable-investment rule) or a constant share of taxes in 
GDP ensuring the government’s solvency now and in the future. Results also show that a    29
transitory increase in public investment does not pay for itself. An extra peso of capital 
spending deteriorates the intertemporal fiscal position. A permanent increase largely pays 
for itself in terms of additional tax revenue but this effect is offset by a deterioration of 
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Table 1 
Calibrated Parameter Values 
 
Parameter Description Value
share parameter in CES consumption function 0.8826
parameter determining elasticity of substitution between consumption goods -0.2200
share parameter in CES investment function 0.3369
parameter determining elasticity of substitution between investment goods -0.2200
weighting parameter for the disutility of working time 6.0278
parameter determining intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply  1.6000
scale parameter in CES investment function 1.8680
subjective discount factor 0.9400
rate of depreciation of business capital stock 0.0369
rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital stock 0.0400
foreign borrowing rate 0.0400
borrowing spread 0.0420
semi-elasticity sovereign yield spread to government debt to GDP ratio 0.3000
capital share parameter in the production function 0.2394
infrastructure capital share in the production function 0.1470
share parameter in CES infrastructure capital aggregator function 0.4784
coeff. determining elasticity of substitution between public and private infrastructure  3.0000
rate of depreciation of human capital stock 0.0400
knowledge acquisition rate 0.0006
infrastructure capital aggregator scaling parameter  1.9995























Benchmark Fiscal Policy Stance (as of year-end 2003) 
 
(% of GDP) (%)
Tax revenue 14.1 Tax rates
Nontax revenue 1.5 Consumption 12.0






Primary surplus -1.0 Debt
Interest payments (approx) 4.4 Central government gross debt 54.0
Overall budget surplus -5.5
(% of GDP)
Return on infrastructure capital  7.1
Other revenue (adjustment factor) 5.4
Total revenue 12.6




Primary surplus 2.4 Debt
Net Interest payments 0.0 Rest of government net debt 0.0
Overall budget surplus 2.4
(% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Primary surplus 1.4 Debt
Interest payments (approx) 4.4 Public sector net debt 54.0












-0.75 0.01 9.0 -0.75 1.0 4.0 1.45 4.3 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.1 1.3
ECONOMY WITH NO PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
MEDIUM-TERM OUTCOMES (year 2014)
     GDP growth rate (%) 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.0 3.4 3.4
     Tax revenue (% of GDP) 16.4 16.8 16.6 16.3 16.4 16.4 16.4 16.5 16.1 16.0 17.0 16.4 16.3 16.4 16.2
     Rental price of public capital services (%)   23.5 17.7 19.6 27.6 23.4 23.5 23.5 23.4 24.0 18.4 41.5 23.5 23.4 23.5 23.4
LONG-TERM OUTCOMES (year 2049)
     GDP growth rate (%) 2.9 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.2 2.2 2.9 2.8
     Tax revenue (% of GDP) 16.7 14.5 15.3 18.3 16.6 16.8 16.8 16.8 16.0 16.1 16.8 16.2 17.9 16.4 19.0
     Rental price of public capital services (%)   36.6 20.4 27.5 43.9 36.5 36.6 36.6 36.3 37.8 27.8 58.8 37.3 34.7 36.6 36.0
ECONOMY WITH TAX FINACING SCHEME
MEDIUM-TERM OUTCOMES (year 2014)
     GDP growth rate (%) 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
     Tax revenue (% of GDP) 17.7 17.5 17.6 17.8 17.5 17.8 17.8 17.6 18.0 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.7 17.5
     Rental price of public capital services (%)   13.1 15.8 15.0 10.6 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.2 12.6 12.0 16.5 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.0
LONG-TERM OUTCOMES (year 2049)
     GDP growth rate (%) 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7
     Tax revenue (% of GDP) 16.5 17.1 16.8 16.2 16.1 16.7 16.7 16.5 16.4 16.3 16.6 16.4 16.7 16.2 18.5
     Rental price of public capital services (%)   14.7 15.4 14.9 14.6 14.6 14.7 14.7 14.6 14.8 13.0 20.6 14.8 14.4 14.7 14.2
     Conventions: : parameter determining elasticity of substitution between public and private infrastructure
: parameter determining elasticity of substitution between investment goods
: parameter determining intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply
: rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital stock
: rate of depreciation of human capital stock
: semi-elasticity sovereign yield spread to government debt-GDP ratio
(benchmark = 3.00) (benchmark = -0.22) (benchmark = 0.30) (benchmark = 0.04) (benchmark = 0.04) (benchmark = 1.60)
s ν
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Table 4 
Is A Permanent Government Spending Increase Self-Amortizing? 
(% of GDP) 
 
Additional Additional Additional Additional
Tax Revenue User Charges Tax Revenue User Charges
Benchmark parameterization 1.44 -1.76 0.69 -0.05
… with unchanged tax rates  0.86 -1.65 0.00 0.08
0.70 0.85 0.65 0.06
1.09 -0.50 0.67 0.00
1.58 -2.28 0.69 -0.07
1.44 -1.76 0.69 -0.05
1.44 -1.76 0.69 -0.05
1.44 -1.76 0.69 -0.05
1.46 -1.75 0.70 -0.04
1.33 -1.82 0.64 -0.08
1.66 -1.64 0.70 -0.09
1.20 -1.73 0.68 -0.02
1.54 -1.80 0.69 -0.05
1.25 -1.68 0.68 -0.05
1.44 -1.76 0.69 -0.05
1.44 -1.76 0.69 -0.05
Conventions: : parameter determining elasticity of substitution between public and private infrastructure
: parameter determining elasticity of substitution between investment goods
: parameter determining intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply
: rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital stock
: rate of depreciation of human capital stock
: semi-elasticity sovereign yield spread to government debt-GDP ratio
Capital Spending Current Spending
1% of GDP Permanent Increase in Central Government Spending:
75 . 0











45 . 1 = ξ









10 . 0 = ε
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Table 5 
Is A Transitory Government Spending Increase Self-Amortizing? 
(% of GDP) 
 
Additional Additional Add. Depreciation Additional Additional Add. Depreciation
Tax Revenue User Charges Charges Tax Revenue User Charges Charges
Benchmark parameterization 0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00
… with unchanged tax rates  0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00
0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00
0.07 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.00
0.11 -0.14 0.02 0.07 -0.05 0.00
0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00
0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.00
0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.00
0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.00
0.09 -0.09 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00
0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.00
0.09 -0.10 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.00
0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00
0.11 -0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.00
0.10 -0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.00
0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
Conventions: : parameter determining elasticity of substitution between public and private infrastructure
: parameter determining elasticity of substitution between investment goods
: parameter determining intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply
: rate of depreciation of infrastructure capital stock
: rate of depreciation of human capital stock
: semi-elasticity sovereign yield spread to government debt-GDP ratio
Capital Spending
1% of GDP Temporary Increase in Central Government Spending:
Current Spending
75 . 0











45 . 1 = ξ









10 . 0 = ε
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Table 6 
Major Public Enterprises with Investment in Infrastructure 
Debt and Overall Surplus in 2003 
(% of GDP) 
 





CENTRALES ELECTRICAS DE NARIÑO -0.01 0.00
ELECTRIFICADORA DEL META 0.00 na
ELECTRIFICADORA DE SANTANDER 0.00 0.01













na: not available  40
Figure 1 
Expected Deficits of the State Social Security System 
(% of GDP) 
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Figure 2A 
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Figure 3A 
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Figure 4B 
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Figure 4C 
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Figure 5A 
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Figure 5B 
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Figure 5C 













































































































































































































































































Tax financing  52
Figure 5D 
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